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Abstract 
This  paper  empirically  examines  whether  feelings  of  altruism  and  fairness  towards  members  of 
other  generations  affect  people’s  evaluation  of  the  public  pension  system.  The  data  come  from  a 
large-scale  survey  carried  out  among  a representative  sample  of  the  Dutch  population  in  January 
1994. The questionnaire  asked respondents  to evaluate  changes  in the pension  system  which  would 
have  different  income  effects  for  different  generations.  We find that young  and  middle-aged  people, 
indeed,  seem  to  be  affected  by  feelings  of  altruism  and  fairness,  whereas  the  elderly  appear  to  be 
less  altruistic. 
JEL  classijication:  H55;  D63 
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1.  Introduction 
The  drop  in  population  growth  rates  in  recent  decades  has  led  to  increasing 
contribution  rates  of  Pay-As-You-Go-financed  (PAYG)  public  pension  schemes.  This 
trend  is  expected  to  continue  in  the  next  two  or  three  decades.  The  change  in  the 
population  growth  rates  raises  some  major  policy  questions.  First,  will  the  young  people 
support  maintaining  the  PAYG-system  even  though  the  intergenerational  redistributions 
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engendered  by  the  system  will  diminish  their  lifetime  incomes?  Second,  will  the  elderly 
consent  to  decreasing  their  pension  benefits  in  order  to  protect  the  younger  generation 
against  the  above-mentioned  negative  effect  on  their  lifetime  income?  Relevant  to  the 
issue  are  also  other,  non-monetary  considerations.  Do  solidarity,  altruism  and  fairness 
play  a role  in  the  functioning  of  a public  pension  system?  How  do  people  evaluate  their 
situation  if  the  structure  of  the  scheme  changes  and,  consequently,  the  extent  of  fairness 
and  (required)  solidarity  changes?  What  is  a  fair  rate  of  return  for  various  generations? 
Empirical  answers  to  these  questions  can  be  obtained  by  explicitly  introducing 
considerations  of  altruism  and  fairness  in  economic  modelling.  Numerous  psychological 
and  economic  experimental  studies  have  already  established  that  norms  of  fairness  can 
affect  market  outcomes.  De  Vries  (1991)  for  instance,  argued  that  many  people  believe 
that  certain  norms  of  social  justice  determine  the  boundaries  for  tolerable  behaviour. 
Moreover,  he claimed  that  people  maximize  their  own  well-being  within  these  boundaries 
(see  De  Vries,  1991,  p. 58).  In  experimental  settings  several  other  authors  (e.g.  Fehr  et al., 
1993,  Kahneman  et  al.,  1986a  and  Burrows  and  Loomes,  1994)  have  concluded  that 
people  value  fairness.  Kahneman  et  al.  (1986b),  Piron  and  Femandez  (1995),  and  Frey 
and  Pommerehne  (1993)  on  the  other  hand,  have  used  questionnaires  to examine  notions 
of  fairness. 
Quantitative  results  on  the  impact  of  altruism  and  fairness  are  however,  scarce. 
Furthermore,  the  aforementioned  surveys  considered  effects  of  fairness  in  a firm-related 
context,  whereas  we  focus  on  the  role  of  fairness  in  the  public  sector.  Here,  the 
individual’s  utility  is assumed  to be  affected  by  the  income  of other  generations  (altruism) 
and  by  the  ratio  of  pension  benefits  to  contributions  (fairness).  The  statistical  model 
permits  testing  whether  the  coefficients  of altruism  and  fairness  are  significantly  different 
from  zero.  It  also  enables  us  to  asses  the  quantitative  importance  of  altruism  versus 
fairness.  As  most  pension  plans  are  mandatory,  which  implies  that  individuals  cannot 
directly  disclose  their  preferences  regarding  these  pension  plans,  we  cannot  use  standard 
revealed  preference  methods  in  our  empirical  analysis.  Therefore,  we  have  opted  for 
stated  preference  methods  (see,  e.g.  Kroes  and  Sheldon,  1988).  We  asked  individuals  to 
evaluate  various  situations  in  which  their  own  income  position,  the  income  position  of 
others,  and  the  ratio  of pension  benefits  to contributions  changed.  Respondents  were  thus 
not  asked  to evaluate  fairness  or altruism  directly,  but  had  to evaluate  the  outcomes  of the 
pension  system  under  various  scenarios.  The  possible  impact  of  feelings  of  altruism  and 
fairness  can  then  be  inferred  from  the  statistical  model.  The  results  show  that  both 
altruism  and  fairness  play  a significant  role. 
We  now  present  the  statistical  model  in  Section  2.  Section  3  shows  the  estimation 
results,  whereas  Section  4  concludes  the  discussion. 
2.  Specification  and  data 
2.1.  Spec@ation 
Individuals  are  grouped  into  one  of  three  generations,  namely,  the  young  (25 
44  years  old),  the  middle-aged  (45-64  years)  and  the  old  generation  (older  than E.C.M.  van der  Heijden  et al. /J.  of Economic  Behavior  & Org.  32  (1997)  505-518  507 
65  years).*  Altruism  is  taken  into  consideration  by  incorporating  the  income,  or  more 
generally  the  well-being,  of  other  individuals  in  an  individual’s  utility  function.  Fairness 
is taken  into  consideration  by  incorporating  the  rates  of return  on  pension  contributions  in 
this  utility  function.  The  rate  of  return  is  given  by  the  ratio  of  pension  benefits  to 
contributions.  It should  be  noted  that  altruism  and  fairness  can  lead  to comparable  effects, 
but  this  need  not  be  the  case.  For  example,  an  increase  in  the  pension  benefits  of  a 
generation  having  low  incomes  and  low  rates  of  return  might  be  supported  by  other 
generations  for  both  altruistic  and  fairness  considerations.  If  however,  the  generation 
happens  to  have  a relatively  high  income,  altruism  and  fairness  might  point  in  opposite 
directions. 
The  utility  for  an  individual  of generation  k (k=y,  m,  o)  in  pension  system  scenario  s is 
represented  by  the  following  logarithmic  function: 
In U,k =  &  +  (_ykYi  +  pk( Yt +  Yi) +  c  (%&  +  $&  +  &,Spartner  +  &gender 
g=ww 
+4ww  g,h,i,k=y,m,o;  h#i#k  (1) 
where  U,” denotes  the  utility  in  scenario  s of  an  individual  belonging  to  generation  k,  Y: 
denotes  the  discounted  lifetime  income  of  the  respondent  in  scenario  s  and  Y,”  +  Yi 
denotes  the  sum  of  discounted  lifetime  incomes  of  the  representative  individuals  of  the 
other  two  generations  in  scenario  s.~  The  lifetime  income  for  a  young  individual  in 
scenario  s  reads  Yy =  In y; s +  R-‘ln  y’, s +  R-*ln  yy 
years  and  $,,  (k  =  y, m,  o)  the  income  in  scenarios 
os  with  R  a  discount  factor  over  20 
i  when  young,  middle-aged  and  old, 
respectively,  Yy  and  Y;  are  defined  analogously.  Note  that  it  is  assumed  here  that  the 
effects  of  the  individual  background  characteristics,  partner  (O=no,  l=yes),  gender 
(O=female,  1  =male)  and  age,  depend  on  the  particular  scenario  the  subject  is evaluating 
(see  below). 
The  effect  of altruism  is indicated  by  the  parameter  pk.” The  first  conjecture  then  reads: 
Conjecture  1: Individuals  are  altruistic  with  respect  to members  of other  generations,  that 
is,  Bk >  0. 
’  A  distinction  into  three  instead  of  two  generations  (young,  who  would  then  be  25-64  years  of  age,  and  the 
elderly)  is  motivated  by  the  fact  that  the  middle-aged  share  characteristics  of  the  two  other  groups.  Like  the 
young,  they  pay  a  contribution  to  the  public  pension  scheme.  Just  like  the  elderly,  however,  they  will  usually 
prefer  a  PAYG-system  to  a  Capital  Reserve  (CR)  system,  as  in  the  latter  system  the  time  left  to  generate  high 
returns  on  their  contributions  is  (too)  short.  In  general,  therefore,  young  and  middle-aged  individuals  will  not 
evaluate  alternative  scenarios  similarly. 
3 A  representative  individual  is  an  individual  of  the  same  gender  and  with  the  same  marital  status  as  the 
respondent.  Representative  individuals  for  the  young,  the  middle-aged  and  the  old  generation  are  35,  55,  and  70 
years  old,  respectively. 
4 It  follows  from  E$.  (1)  that  we  have  implicitly  assumed  that  the  incomes  of  the  other  two  generations  are 
weighted  equally.  This  assumption  is  not  obvious.  It  could,  for  instance,  be  the  case  that  younger  people  feel 
affectionate  towards  the  old  generation  but  not  towards  the  middle-aged  generation.  However,  the  estimation  of  a 
model  with  separate  income  variables  was  hampered  by  multicollinearity  problems. 508  E.C.M.  van  der  Heijden  et  al/J.  of  Economic  Behavior  &  Org.  32  (1997)  505-5I8 
s.~ 
The variable  $,,  is the actual  rate of return  of the PAYG-system  for generation  g in scenario 
As  we  will  see  in  Table  5,  these  rates  of  return  are  substantially  different  across 
generations.  Regarding  the rates  of return  we conjecture  that  individuals  adhere  to a notion 
of  an  optimal  rate  of  return  for  themselves,  as  well  as  for  other  individuals.  Therefore: 
Conjecture  II:  Individuals  prefer  an  ‘optimal’  rate  of return  <*  and  dislike  rates  of return 
that  are  too  high  or too  low  compared  with  this  optimal  rate.  That  is,  6:  <  0 and  7:  >  0.6 
The  ‘optimal’  rate  of  return  for  generation  g as perceived  by  generation  k (4’)  can  be 
calculated  from  the  estimated  parameters  as  -$/26:.  Note  that  we  allow  for  the 
possibility  that  an  individual  desires  a rate  of  return  for  him-  or  herself  that  is  different 
from  the  rate  of  return  he  or  she  desires  for  other  generations.  In  particular,  altruistic 
subjects  might  regard  a relatively  low  rate  of  return  for  themselves  as  fair.  On  the  other 
hand,  selfish  people  might  consider  their  own  rate  of  return  never  to  be  too  high.  In 
particular,  they  might  regard  the  rate  4’  as  a  minimum  instead  of  as  an  optimum. 
Typically,  this  would  result  in  7:  >  0  and  6:  =  0. 
Some  additional  remarks  should  be  made  with  respect  to  the  specification  and  the 
estimation  of  the  utility  function.  Usually,  it  is  assumed  that  utility  is  determined  by 
consumption  possibilities.  However,  data  on  consumption  are  not  available.  Therefore, 
lifetime  income  is used  as  a proxy.  Furthermore,  current  income  is  supposed  to be  equal 
to disposable  income,  which  is defined  as gross  income  minus  taxes  and  savings.  As  the 
development  of  a  person’s  income  is  not  measured,  future  income  and  thus  future 
consumption  of the  younger  people  are  unknown.  We have  assumed  that  future  income  is 
affected  just  by  changes  in  public  pension  benefits  and  contributions.  For  young 
respondents  this  implies  that  their  before-tax  household  income  in  middle  age  cy’,) equals 
their  current  household  income  (y;).  Another  problem  was  the respondents’  income  in  old 
age.  Typically,  retirement  income  consists  of  a  public  pension  payment  supplemented 
with  a complementary  pension  payment  from  a firm-related  pension  plan.  However,  the 
data  revealed  that  most  respondents  (except  the  elderly  people)  had  no  idea  about  the  size 
of  their  own  or  their  partner’s  complementary  pension.  Based  on  this  observation,  we 
decided  to  use  only  the  public  pension  benefit  as  an  indication  for  retirement  income  of 
the  young  and  middle-age  respondents,  yl  and  Y;.~ 
s The  actual  rate  of  return  of  the  PAYG-system  is  defined  as  the  discounted  pension  benefits  divided  by  the 
discounted  pension  contributions  made  during  the  entire  life.  The  actual  rates  of  return  are  calculated  from 
Nelissen  (1994).  assuming  a  real  discount  rate  of  2%  and  a  real  growth  rate  of  the  economy  of  2%  a  year.  We 
have  divided  the  ages  in  categories  of  five  years,  that  is,  25-30  years,  30-35  years  etc.  The  actual  rate  of  return 
for  the  respondent  is  approximated  by  the  average  rate  of  return  for  the  age  category  s/he  belongs  to,  whereas 
the  actual  rates  of  return  for  the  other  two  generations  are  given  by  the  average  rates  of  return  for  the 
representative  members  of  those  generations. 
’  More  specifically,  it  is  assumed  $hat  the  notions  of  fairness  are  determined  by  the  parabolic  specification 
($,$  -  <  )  By  including  &  and  &  separately  in the  regression  equations,  we  can  calculate  the  ‘optimal’  rate 
o  return  f.  The  parabolic  specification  of  the  fairness  function  is  supported  by  the  data  (see  also  Section  3). 
No  assumptions  of  the  value  of  the  optimal  rate  $’  are  made  beforehand. 
7 In  these  scenarios,  implicit  changes  in  private  pension  schemes  were  taken  into  account  by  allowing  a 
substitution  of  these  schemes  for  the  public  pension  scheme.  In particular,  the  amounts  of  old-age  savings  were 
adjusted  in the  alternative  scenarios.  The  neglect  of private  pension  schemes  does  not  affect  the  empirical  results 
as  first  differences  are  used in  the  regression  equation  (as  will  be  explained  later). E.C.M.  van der  Heijden  et al/J.  of Economic  Behavior  & Org.  32  (1997)  505-518  509 
As  respondents  had  to  evaluate  four  pension  scenarios,  for  each  individual  we  have 
four  observations  of  the  dependent  and  independent  variables.  So,  in  estimating  Eq.  (1) 
for  each  generation,  the  total  number  of  observations  equals  four  times  the  number  of 
respondents  in  that  generation.  To  correct  for  individual-specific  effects,  differences  of 
the  relevant  variables  will  be  used.  That  is  to  say,  the  difference  between  the  alternative 
scenario  and  the  basic  scenario  was  calculated  for  each  variable.*  Note,  however,  that  as 
we  assumed  that  the  effect  of  background  variables  is  scenario-specific,  these  variables 
cannot  be  skipped  after  taking  the  differences. 
2.2.  The  questionnaire 
In  order  to  estimate  Eq.  (1)  we  held  a  survey  among  a  representative  sample  of  the 
Dutch  population  in  January  1994.  The  questionnaire  asked  respondents  to  evaluate  the 
current  and  future  public  pension  system  under  various  alternative  assumptions  regarding 
the  size  of the  pension  benefit  and  the  associated  contribution  rates.  Only  one  individual 
of  each  household  was  questioned,  who  was  not  necessarily  the  head  of  the  household. 
See  Van  der  Heijden  (1996)  for  further  details. 
The  main  part  of  the  survey  consisted  of  live  different,  partly  hypothetical  scenarios. 
All  situations  were  characterized  by  specific  values  for  the  relevant  variables:  the  public 
pension  benefit,  public  pension  contributions,  rates  of return  on  pension  contributions  and 
on  savings.  Respondents  saw  the  consequences  of  a  change,  not  only  for  their  own 
household,  but  also  for  the  representative  members  of  the  other  two  generations.  For 
example,  a  single  middle-aged  respondent  received  information  about  the  contribution 
rate,  the  public  pension  benefit,  his  or her  own  contribution  and  the  average  contribution 
of  the  representative  young.  After  explaining  a  scenario,  people  were  asked  to  assign  a 
grade  between  1.00  and  10.00,  with  1.00  the  lowest  possible  grade  and  10.00  the  highest 
possible  grade.  This  scale  corresponds  to  the  marks  used  in  the  Dutch  school  system.  As 
we  referred  to  this  system  in  the  questionnaire,  misperception  or  varying  perceptions 
among  respondents  is  unlikely. 
The  first  scenario  involved  the  present  situation,  which  was  called  the  basic  situation 
(BS).  In  the  basic  situation,  respondents  were  given  information  on  the  current  levels  of 
the  public  pension  benefit,  the  contribution  rate  and  the  average  contribution.  It  was 
assumed  that  the  present  system  would  not  change  over  time.  In  other  words,  the  current 
situation  was  supposed  to  be  the  steady-state  situation;  the  consequences  of  the  ageing 
process  were  ignored. 
The  next  scenario  also  ignored  the  effects  of  ageing.  In  this  hypothetical  situation, 
alterations  in  the  steady-state  situation  occurred  by  introducing  a  once-and-for-all 
randomly  determined  reduction  (LC)  or  increase  (HC)  in  the  contribution  rate  and  thus, 
because  of  the  PAYG-system,  in  the  public  pension  benefit.  All  respondents  were 
’ Taking  differences  resolves  a  number  of  problems,  including  the  following  most  important  one.  One  of  the 
assumptions  of  OLS  is  that  the  error  terms  are  not  correlated  with  the  regressors,  that  is,  the  situation  variables. 
However,  it is possible  that  the  error  term  is individual-dependent  and  correlated  with  the  situation  variables  due 
to the  presence  of  individual  effects.  By  splitting  the  error  term  in  an  individual-specific  part  (independent  of  the 
scenario)  and  a real  random  term  (which  just  depends  on  the  scenario),  and  then  taking  differences  between  the 
alternative  scenarios  and  the  basic  scenario,  the  individual-specific  term  disappears  and  with  that  the  possible 
correlation  with  the  regressor  (see,  e.g.  Baltagi,  1995). 510  E.C.M.  van  der  Heijden  et  al./J.  of Economic  Behavior  &  Org.  32  (1997)  W-518 
informed  about  the  effect  on  the  average  contribution.  The  youngest  generations  were 
also  informed  about  the  results  for  their  own  contribution. 
In  LC,  respondents  were  told  that  the  difference  between  the  contributions  paid  in  BS 
and  LC  would  be  saved.  These  savings  plus  the  interest  earned  were  then  used  as  a 
supplement  to  the  lower  public  pension  benefit  people  would  receive  when  pensioned. 
For  the  richer  young  and  middle-aged  individuals  this  implies  an  increase  in  lifetime 
income  because  of  their  high  contributions  in  BS.  The  assumption  of  a once-and-for-all 
shock  also  implies  that  the  income  position  of the  current  old  always  deteriorated  in  LC. 
Young  and  middle-aged  individuals  were  thus  asked  to  trade  off  their  own  lifetime 
income  position  against  the  worsened  income  position  of  the  elderly.  Appendix  A 
presents  an  example  to illustrate  how  the  information  was  shown  to the  respondents.  The 
consequences  of  scenario  HC  were  just  the  other  way  round.  Here,  respondents  were  told 
that  the  difference  between  the  higher  contributions  in  this  situation  and  the  contributions 
in  BS  would  reduce  the  amount  of  old-age  savings  in  their  savings  account,  or,  when 
people  did  not  have  such  an  account,  should  be  borrowed. 
The  last  two  scenarios  involved  situations  that  did  include  the  consequences  of  the 
ageing  process.  Two  (extreme)  hypothetical  situations  were  presented  to  the  subjects.’ 
The  fourth  scenario,  lower  benefits  (LB),  described  a  situation  in  which  pension 
contribution  rates  did  not  change  but  in  which  ageing  effects  resulted  in  lower  public 
pension  benefits.  The  last  scenario,  equal  benefits  (EB),  described  the  opposite  case.  In 
EB,  the  public  pension  benefit  was  equal  to the  current  pension,  but  the  contribution  rate 
increased  over  time  because  of the  ageing  effects.  As  a result,  the  income  position  of  the 
current  elderly  did  not  change,  whereas  the  lifetime  income  position  of  the  working 
population  deteriorated  because  of  the  higher  contributions. 
3.  Empirical  results 
3. I.  Estimation  results 
In  total,  the  sample  contained  1103  respondents.  After  cleaning  the  data,  944 
respondents  were  left:  225  old,  314  middle-aged  and  405  young.  The  overall  response 
rate  including  technical  non-response  (non-response  owing  to  technical  problems  or 
holidays)  was  70%.  The  overall  response  rate  corrected  for  this  technical  non-response 
was  83%.  Due  to  constraints  of  time  respondents  had  to  evaluate  four  scenarios:  two  of 
these  did  not  take  the  ageing  process  into  account  (BS  and  LC  or  BS  and  HC),  and  two 
did  (LB  and  EB).  From  the  average  grades  assigned  to each  scenario  it appeared  that  all 
generations  preferred  the  status-quo  situation. 
By  applying  OLS  regression  on  differences,  we  estimated  the  impact  of  altruism  and 
fairness  on  the  evaluations  of  the  public  pension  system.  We  show  four  specifications:  a 
specification  in  which  the  rates  of return  have  not  been  included  (variant  1 in Tables  l-3), 
a  variant  in  which  the  rates  of  return  with  respect  to  one’s  own  generation  have  been 
included  (variant  2),  a  specification  in  which  all  relevant  variables  have  been  included 
9 The  values  of  the  relevant  variables  in  these  scenarios  were  calculated  from  van  Dalen  (1991). E.C.M.  van der  Heijden  et al. /J.  of Economic  Behavior  & Org.  32  (1997)  505-518  511 
Table  1 
Estimation  results  for  the  younger  generation  a 
variant 
P 















1.53  (5.51) 
0.24  (5.45) 
-0.08  (-2.86) 
-0.01  (-0.38) 
-0.00  (-  1.46) 
-0.04  (-0.42) 
0.05 
1538 
2  3  4 
1.10  (3.52)  1.43  (4.52)  1.26  (4.03) 
0.26  (3.55)  -0.53  (-0.99)  0.47  (2.79) 
0.94  (5.67)  0.08  (0.16)  0.98  (2.34) 
-0.35  (-4.91)  -0.04  (-0.28)  -0.30  (-2.49) 
-3.15  (-0.64)  1.16  (1.40) 
0.69  (0.61)  -0.31  (-2.1  I) 
1.67  (1.04) 
-0.20  (-0.88) 
-0.07  (-2.56)  -0.09  (-3.10)  -0.08  (-2.72) 
-0.01  (-0.47)  -0.01  (-0.47)  -0.01  (-0.34) 
-0.01  (-2.80)  -0.01  (-1.39)  -0.01  (-1.40) 
0.21  (1.70)  0.08  (0.56)  0.12  (0.86) 
0.08  0.10  0.09 
1506  1481  1487 
a t-values  between  parentheses. 
Table  2 
Estimation  results  for  the  middle-aged  generation 
variant  1  2  3  4 
Ym  1  .OO (3.30)  0.66  (1.96)  -0.12  (-0.37)  0.08  (0.27) 
YY  +  Y”  0.28  (2.39)  0.35  (3.04)  -0.48  (-0.38)  0.79  (6.74) 
c  5.36  (0.89)  9.39  (8.82) 
T2  -3.09  (-1.08)  -4.72  (-8.32) 
G  0.62  (5.17)  0.11  (0.79) 
c2  -0.12  (-4.78)  -0.00  (-0.07) 
$  0.89  (0.99) 
c2  -0.07  (-0.90) 
partner  -0.01  (-0.23)  -0.00  (0.07)  -0.00  (-0.05)  0.00  (0.04) 
gender  -0.00  (-0.14)  0.01  (0.47)  0.01  (0.17)  0.01  (0.26) 
age  0.00  (0.25)  -0.00  (-  1.61)  0.00  (0.19)  0.00  (0.29) 
constant  -0.22  (-1.68)  0.10  (0.68)  -0.19  (-1.35)  -0.20  (-1.62) 
-2 
R  0.11  0.14  0.23  0.23 
AIC  1018  995  893  889 
(variant  3),  and,  finally,  a variant  being  the  most  satisfactory  one  from  both  an  economic 
(significant  coefficients  and  correct  signs)  and  statistical  (based  on  the  Akaike 
Information  Criterion  (AIC))  viewpoint.”  Although  variant  3  is  plagued  by  multi- 
”  We  estimated  specification  (l),  in  which  the  coefficients  of  the  background  variables  may  differ  across 
scenarios.  However,  for  all  generations  F-tests  show  that  at  the  5%-level  none  of  the  coefficients  of  the 
background  variables  (4i.3,  i, s =  1,2,3)  are  significantly  different  across  the  (differences  between)  scenarios. 
For  instance,  for  the  variable  partner  of  the  old  generation  the  hypothesis  41,~ =  41,~ =  41.3 cannot  be  rejected. 
Therefore,  and  for  reasons  of  presentation,  we  have  chosen  to  present  the  results  of  the  models  in  which  the 
coefficients  of  the  background  characteristics  are  equal  across  the  scenarios. 512  E.C.M.  van der  Heijden  et nl./J.  of  Economic  Behavior  & Org.  32  (1997)  S-518 
Table  3 
Estimation  results  for  the  older  generation 
variant  I  2  3  4 
P 













0.58  (3.79) 
0.08  (1.49) 
0.05  (1.43) 
0.07  (2.01) 
-0.01  (-1.40) 
0.06  (0.22) 
0.06 
728 
0.69  (4.52) 
0.41  (4.31) 
0.46  (1.95) 
PO.09  (-3.07) 
0.07  ( 1.94) 
0.07  (2.15) 
-0.01  (p  1.43) 
0.16  (0.64) 
0.11 
695 
0.42  (2.54) 
0.62  (1.38) 
13.17  (3.07) 
-7.15  (-3.53) 
-4.02  (-0.63) 
0.90  (0.65) 
1.24  (0.78) 
-0.19  (-0.77) 
0.08  (2.05) 
0.08  (2.25) 
-0.01  (-  1.57) 
0.10  (0.41) 
0.13 
686 
0.46  (3.16) 
0.76  (3.62) 
12.76  (6.55) 
-7.22  (-6.23) 
0.08  (2.20) 
0.08  (2.32) 
-0.01  (-1.58) 
0.05  (0.21) 
0.13 
680 
collinearity  problems,  (indirect)  indications  of the  effects  of  altruism  and  fairness  can  be 
obtained  by  estimating  the  other  variants  and  by  comparing  them  with  variant  3. 
Table  1  presents  the  estimated  coefficients  for  the  younger  generation.  Obviously, 
lifetime  income  of  the  young  respondents  themselves  (Yy)  plays  a  key  role  in  the 
evaluation  of  the  pension  system.  Its  coefficient  is  significant  and  positive  in  all  the 
variants  considered.  Further,  it  is  rather  robust  over  the  specifications;  its  average  value 
being  1.34. The  introduction  of altruism,  measured  via  the  income  of others,  and  fairness, 
measured  via  the  rates  of return,  improves  the  explanatory  power  of the  equation  and  the 
value  of the  AK  (lower  AIC  values  are  better).  The  estimated  coefficient  of altruism  (i.e. 
,@) is lower  than  that  of the generation’s  own  income  but  significantly  positive  and  robust 
when  at most  the  rates  of return  for  the  young  themselves  are  included  (variants  1 and  2). 
One-sided  r-tests  show  that  flk >  0 at the  5%  level,  which  supports  Conjecture  I. Adding 
the  rates  of  return  of  the  old  generation  (rz  and  r$)  in  addition  to  altruism  leads  to 
problems  regarding  the  statistical  significance  of the  variables  and  their  signs;  see  variant 
3.  However,  additional  estimations  not  reported  here  (see  Van  der  Heijden,  1996)  show 
that  precise  and  meaningful  estimates  for  rz and  ri2 can  be  obtained  when  altruism  is not 
included.  In  that  case,  two-sided  F-tests  reveal  that  the  hypothesis  that  the  coefficients  of 
the  rates  of  return  of  the  elderly  are  equal  to  zero  can  be  rejected  at  the  5%  level.  In 
addition,  one-sided  t-tests  show  that  the  separate  coefficients  have  the  expected  sign  and 
that  they  are  significant  at the  5%  level.  Together  these  results  are  in  favour  of Conjecture 
II  that  y  >  0  and  6 <  0  .  From  variants  1  and  4,  and  from  additional  estimates  not 
reported  here,  it appears  that  the  estimation  results  for the  rates  of return  of the  young  and 
middle-aged  generation  even  more  strongly  support  Conjecture  II:  no  matter  whether  or 
not  altruism  is  included,  the  values  of  the  estimated  coefficients  satisfy  the  supposed 
parabolic  specification.  That  is,  two-sided  F-tests  that  y  =  0  and  S =  0 and  one-sided  t- 
tests  that  y  5  0  and  S >  0  can  be  rejected  at  the  5%  level.  This  implies  that  younger 
subjects  have  some  idea  regarding  ‘fair’  rates  of  return  both  for  their  own  and  for  other E.C.M.  van der  Heijden  et al./J.  of Economic  Behavior  & Org.  32  (1997)  505-518  513 
generations.  We  will  come  back  to  that  later.  Variant  4 is  the  model  with  a good,  that  is, 
low,  AIC  value  and  correct  values  for  all  variables  included;  based  on  a  x2-test  we  can 
conclude  that  the  AIC  value  of variant  4 is not  significantly  different  from  that  of variant 
3. Finally,  F-tests  confirm  that  variant  4 is a robust  specification.  That  is, no  variables  can 
be  excluded  while  the  rates  of  return  of  the  elderly  cannot  be  included. 
In  all  specifications,  the  coefficients  of the  background  characteristics  are rather  robust. 
The  coefficient  for  the  presence  of  a partner  is  significantly  negative.  The  presence  of  a 
partner  may  be  an  indicator  for  the  presence  of  children  and  thus  for  the  size  of  the 
household.  This  might  explain  why  changes  in  the  system  lead  to  significantly  larger 
losses  and  smaller  gains  when  a partner  is  present.  Age  and  gender  have  a small  robust, 
but  mostly  insignificant,  negative  effect.  One  reason  for  this  age  effect  could  be  that  older 
respondents  have  fewer  alternatives  to  the  public  pension  scheme  than  do  younger 
individuals.  Finally,  the  intercept  term  is  small  and  most  of  the  time  insignificant. 
Table  2 presents  the  regression  results  for  the  middle-aged  generation.  What  stands  out 
quite  remarkably  is  the  less  robust  effect  of  their  own  lifetime  income  (Ym).  Adding 
altruism,  in  particular  fairness,  improves  the  explanatory  power  and  reduces  the  AIC.  The 
rates  of return  of the  elderly  (5  and  c’)  appear  to interfere  with  altruism  again,  but  also 
with  the  lifetime  incomes  of  the  middle-aged  (compare  variants  1 and  2 with  variants  3 
and  4).  When  c  and  c2  are  not  included,  the  estimated  coefficient  of  altruism  is 
significantly  positive;  this  supports  Conjecture  I. Furthermore,  two-sided  F-tests  and  one- 
sided  t-tests  at  the  5%  level  provide  evidence  for  Conjecture  II  concerning  the  rates  of 
return  of  all  generations.  However,  for  the  rates  of  return  with  respect  to  the  older 
generation,  this  only  holds  when  altruism  is  not  included  (specification  not  presented 
here).  Although  the  coefficient  of one’s  own  income  is not  significantly  positive,  variant  4 
gives  the  best  model  in  terms  of  AIC;  the  AIC  value  is  significantly  lower  than  that  of 
variant  3,  which  is  in  its  turn  significantly  lower  than  those  of  variants  1  and  2. 
Furthermore,  variant  4  is  robust  when  applying  F-tests. 
Contrary  to  what  was  found  for  the  young  generation,  background  characteristics 
hardly  affect  the  utility  of  the  middle-aged  generation.  This  suggests  that  the  evaluations 
of  the  pension  system  do  not  depend  on  the  specific  scenario  they  are  confronted  with. 
Table  3 shows  that  for  the  elderly  their  own  actual  income  has  a significantly  positive 
effect  on  the  evaluation  of  the  pension  system.  The  estimated  coefficients  of  their  own 
income  are  robust  but  considerably  smaller  compared  with  those  of the  other  enerations. 
-5 
Introduction  of  altruism  and  fairness  again  results  in  a considerably  higher  R  and  lower 
AK.  In  favour  of  Conjecture  I,  the  estimated  coefficient  of  altruism  is  positive  in  all 
variants  considered,  though  not  always  significant  at  the  5%  level  (one-sided  ?-tests). 
Moreover,  the  size  of  this  coefficient  in  variant  1, that  is,  without  any  rates  of  return,  is 
much  lower  than  for  the  other  two  generations.  We  also  find  evidence  for  Conjecture  II; 
all  significantly  estimated  coefficients  for  the  rates  of  return  always  satisfy  y  >  0  and 
S <  0 and  the joint  hypothesis  y  =  0 and  6 =  0 can  be  rejected  at the  5%  level  (including 
additional  estimates).  Especially,  the  rates  of  return  of  the  young  generation  appear  to 
have  a  robust  and  significant  effect  across  all  specifications  for  the  elderly.  Again, 
estimation  of the  full  model  (variant  3) leads  to statistical  and  interpretation  problems.  As 
for  the  middle-aged  generation,  variant  4 gives  a good  and  meaningful  model  for  the  old 
generation.  This  specification,  which  includes  altruism  and  the  rates  of  return  of  the 514  E.C.M.  van der  Heijden  et al./J.  of  Economic  Behavior  &  Org.  32 (1997)  505-518 
Table  4 
Elasticities  of  own  income,  altruism  and  fairness 
yaw  middle-aged  old 
own  income 
altruism 
fairness 
1.34  1.23  0.53 
0.24  0.28  0.08 
0.002  (middle)  0.004  (young)  0.001  (young) 
0.001  (old)  0.003  (old)  0.001  (middle) 
young  generation,  is  robust  in  terms  of  F-tests  and  its  AIC  value  is  significantly  lower 
than  the  AIC  value  of  variant  3. 
The  estimated  coefficients  for  the  background  characteristics  are  rather  robust  and 
significant  in  almost  all  variants  considered  for  the  old  generation.  Partner  and  gender 
have  a significantly  positive  impact,  whereas  age  has  a negative,  but  insignificant,  impact. 
The  presence  of  a partner  results  in  higher  evaluations  of changes  in  the  pension  system. 
The  reason  might  be  that  couples  generally  have  better  (occupational)  pension  claims  and 
that  the  basic  state  pension  takes  into  account  economies-of-scale  effects.  The  former 
point  abo  holds  for men,  which  explains  the  significant  result  for the  variable  gender.  The 
negative  age  effect  may  be  related  to  the  fact  that  the  probability  of  having  an 
occupational  pension  in  the  Netherlands  is  higher  the  later  one  is  born.  Again,  the 
intercept  term  does  not  significantly  differ  from  zero. 
3.2.  Some  specific  results  with  respect  to  altruism  and fairness 
Several  other  results  can  be  inferred  from  the  estimated  coefficients.  For  example,  the 
elasticities  of  altruism  and  fairness  are  useful  for  comparing  the  size  of  the  effects  of 
altruism  and  fairness.  The  elasticities  of  one’s  own  income  and  of  altruism,  which  are 
given  by  the  estimated  coefficients,  are  given  in  Table  4,  as  well  as  the  elasticities  of 
fairness  towards  each  of  the  other  generations.” 
Table  4  shows  that  the  elasticities  of  altruism  and  ‘egoism’  are  about  equal  for  the 
young  and  the  middle-aged  generation,  while  for  the  older  generation  both  elasticities  are 
substantially  lower.  The  ratios  of the  two  elasticities,  which  might  be called  the  ‘degree  of 
egoism’  are  5.6,4.4  and  6.6,  respectively.  Therefore,‘the  old  generation  is somewhat  less 
altruistic  than  the  other  two  generations.  For  all  generations,  however,  Conjecture  I 
appears  to  be  corroborated. 
Finally,  we  discuss  the  rates  of  return  preferred  by  each  generation.  Recall  that  the 
desired  or  ‘optimal’  rate  of  return  for  generation  g  as  perceived  by  generation  k  (rf)  is 
given  by  -7:/26:.  Table  5 presents  the  optimal  rates  of return  desired  by  each  generation 
and  the  average  actual  rates  of  return  by  generation.  For  the  calculation  of  the  table  we 
have  considered  only  significant  parameter  estimates,  also  using  additional  estimates  not 
reported  here  (see  Van  der  Heijden,  1996).  The  figures  between  parentheses  denote  the 
standard  deviation  of  the  optimal  rate  of  return  and  the  number  of  specifications  used  to 
calculate  this  rate. 
”  When  calculating  the  elasticities  of  altruism,  we  considered  only  those  variants  in  which  no  rates  of  return 
were  included.  This  is  motivated  by  the  fact  that  the  rates  of  return  affect  the  altruism  variables. E.C.M.  van der  Heijden  et al./J.  of Economic  Behavior  & Org.  32  (1997)  505-518  515 
Table  5 
Optimal  rates  of  return 
optimal  rates  of  return  for 
perceived  by  young  middle-aged  old 
young  1.47  (0.14,  n  =  4)  2.37  (0.23,  n  =  4)  4.42  (0.44,  n  =  4) 
middle-aged  0.97  (0.03,  n  =  6)  2.69  (0.04,  n  =  2)  5.24  (0.16,  n  =  4) 
old  0.91  (0.03,  n  =  8)  2.19  (0.17,  n  =  2)  2.98  (0.72,  n  =  2) 
actual  rate  of  return  1.2  2.4  3.5 
The  calculations  of  the  optimal  rates  of  return  yield  robust  estimates  for  all 
generations.  Clearly,  young  respondents  take  the  status-quo  rates  of  return  as  the 
preferable  rates,  which  should  not  be  amended  too  drastically  (compare  the  first  and  the 
last  row).  It  is remarkable  that  the  young  generation  would  favour  a higher  rate  of return 
for  the  old  generation  (although  that  rate  is  already  fairly  high).  The  optimal  rates  of 
return  for  the  middle-aged  generation  (second  row)  suggest  that  just  like  the  youngest 
individuals,  middle-aged  individuals  regard  it as  fair  that  the  rates  of return  for  the  older 
generations  are higher  than  for the  youngest  generations.  The  elderly  prefer  rates  of return 
for  the  middle-aged  generation  and  for  their  own  generation  close  to  the  actual  rates 
(compare  the  third  and  the  last  row).  Finally,  from  Tables  1,  2  and  3  we  already 
ascertained  that  Conjecture  II  cannot  be  rejected.  This  conclusion  combined  with  the 
results  of  Table  5  imply  that  all  generations  consider  deviations  of  the  actual  rates  of 
return  from  a perceived  optimal  rate  of return  as unfair.  In  most  cases,  an  increase  in  the 
fairness  ratio  is  considered  to  be  fair.  The  middle-aged  and  the  old  generation,  however, 
regard  a  small  loss  on  the  investments  in  the  public  pension  system  for  the  younger 
generation  as  fair. 
4.  Concluding  remarks 
This  paper  has  discussed  the  possible  effect  of feelings  of altruism  and  fairness  on  the 
evaluation  of  the  public  pension  system.  In  general,  it  is  assumed  that  utility  of 
individuals  is determined  by  their  own  current  and  (expected)  future  incomes.  In  addition 
to this,  it is supposed  here  that  feelings  of altruism,  expressed  by  the  incomes  of members 
of  other  generations,  and  sense  of justice  or  fairness,  represented  by  rates  of return  of the 
PAYG  pension  system,  can  affect  people’s  utility.  The  data  used  for  estimating  the  utility 
functions  were  obtained  from  a  large-scale  survey  carried  out  among  a  representative 
sample  of  the  Dutch  population  in  January  1994.  The  questionnaire  required  respondents 
to  evaluate  several  changes  in  the  public  pension  system  that  had  varying  income  effects 
for  different  generations.  By  stating  their  preferences,  respondents  also  implicitly 
reported  on  the  degree  to  which  other  generations’  utility  and  fairness  ratios  affect  their 
own  utility.  The  analysis  shows  that  both  altruism  and  fairness  can  have  a  substantial 
impact  on  lifetime  utility;  for  all  generations  the  AIC  value  of the  model  without  altruism 
and  fairness  is  the  worst  among  all  possible  specifications. 516  E.C.M.  van  der  Heijden  et at. /J.  of Eco?tomic i3ehavior  &  Org.  32  (‘1997)  M-518 
The  conjecture  that  altruism,  which  in  general  is  not  included  in  empirical  studies  in 
the  field  of  pensions,  affects  utility  is  supported  by  the  estimation  results.  This  justifies 
theoretical  models  in  which  lifetime  consumption  or  income  of  other  generations  is  an 
argument  of  a generation’s  utility.  Altruism  towards  other  generations  is  present  among 
all  generations,  but  it  is the  strongest  among  the  working  population.  Compared  with  the 
effects  of  the  income  of  the  working  generations  themselves,  the  elasticity  of  altruism 
amounts  to  about  20%  of  the  elasticity  of one’s  own  income.  For  the  old  generation,  this 
proportion  amounts  to about  15%.  The  elderly  thus  appear  to be  somewhat  less  altruistic. 
The  reason  for  this  is  unclear.  A  possible  explanation  could  be  that  the  elderly  are 
altruistic  in  other  realms,  like  bequests.  However,  including  bequests  (which  were  also 
asked  for  in  the  survey)  in  the  analysis  did  not  result  in  another  picture.  Bequests  by 
themselves  had  no  significant  effect  on  the  evaluation,  too. 
Although  the  effect  of  fairness  is  rather  small  in  terms  of  elasticities,  we  find  that 
fairness  clearly  determines  a generation’s  utility  as well.  The  conjecture  that  the  rates  of 
return  satisfy  a parabolic  specification  is supported  by  the  data.  Moreover,  all  generations 
seem  to have  clear  ideas  about  fairness  ratios.  In view  of the  multicollinearity  problems,  it 
may  be  striking  that  the  optimal  fairness  ratios  have  a  very  robust  character.  It  is  also 
marked  that  the  population  of  working  age  considers  a relatively  high  rate  of  return  for 
the old  generation  to be fair.  Actually,  the  younger  part  of the population  would  be willing 
to support  an  increase  of the  public  pension  benefits  for  reasons  of fairness,  but  not  out  of 
altruism. 
However,  it  also  appears  to  be  difficult  to  discriminate  between  altruistic  feelings  and 
fairness  motives.  This  can  partly  be  ascribed  to statistical  reasons,  but  in  part  it might  also 
be  due  to  the  fact  that  individuals  themselves  make  no  clear  distinction  between  these 
concepts.  Yet,  it  should  be  noted  that  in  studies  showing  fairness  to  be  a determinant  of 
behaviour  (see  Kahneman  et  al.,  1986a,  Giith  et  al.,  1982  and  Binmore  et  al.,  1985  for 
results  in  experimental  settings),  no  clear  distinction  between  altruism  and  fairness  is 
usually  made. 
The  size  of the  income  coefficients  implies  that  the  average  non-aged  person  is willing 
to return  one  percent  of his  or her  income  if the  situation  of an  aged  person  then  increases 
by  at  least  5.5  percent.  In  that  case,  lifetime  utility  does  not  decrease.  In  the  current 
situation  in  the  Netherlands,  a  one  percent  increase  in  the  contribution  for  the  old-age 
state  pension  results  in  an  increase  in  the  old-age  pension  benefit  by  6.9  percent.  This 
implies  that  the  current  old-age  state  pension  system  increases  utility  for  all  generations. 
This  possibly  explains  the  point  that  the  system  remains  acceptable  in  the  Netherlands 
despite  the  fact  that  it  does  not  meet  the  Aaron  condition  at  the  moment.  However,  the 
foregoing  also  implies  that  the  system  will  come  under  pressure  when  demographic 
changes  result  in  a lower  rate  of return.  Given  the  current  demographic  forecast,  this  will 
occur  in  about  2015.  An  increase  in  the  contribution  rate  by  one  percentage  point  will 
then  result  in  an  increase  in  the  pension  benefit  by  less  than  5.5  percent.  The  rather  high 
dependency  ratio  in  the  Netherlands  (more  than  30%  in  2015)  means  that  increases  in  the 
old  generation’s  income  cannot  compensate  for  the  reduced  lifetime  income  of the  young 
and  middle-aged  themselves.  Thus,  the  elderly’s  speculation  on  altruism  by  the  young  (as 
in  Veal],  1986)  is  a risky  thing  to  do  in  the  long  run.  However,  if the  elderly  claim  that  a 
continuation  of the  PAYG  system  is  ‘fair’  (as  is  sometimes  done  in  public  discussions  in E.C.M.  van der  Heijden  et al./J.  of Economic  Behavior  & Org.  32  (1997)  505-518  517 
the  Netherlands),  future  elderly  might  have  a better  chance  to find  support  for  the  system. 
At  any  rate,  the  dominant  one-way  transfers  from  the  young  to  the  old  generation  in 
western  welfare  states  could  be  a  result  of  these  specific  forms  of  intergenerational 
altruism  and  notion  of  fairness. 
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Appendix  A 
Example  from  the  questionnaire 
Below  we  show  a part  of the  questionnaire  in  order  to demonstrate  how  the  information 
was  provided  to a (young)  respondent.  The  question  involved  was  as follows:  How  would 
you  evaluate  the  situation  with  lower  contribution  rates  and  lower  pension  benefits?  The 
respondent  already  had  evaluated  the  basic  situation. 
contribution  rate 
own  contribution 
average  contribution 
own  public  pension 
public  pension  for  an  old  person 
public  pension  for  a middle-aged  person 
own  ratio 
ratio  of  a  middle-aged  person 
ratio  of  an  old  person 
own  return  on  savings 
return  on  savings  for  a  middle-aged  person 
own  public  pension  +  savings 
public  pension  +  savings  for  a middle-aged  person 





f  300 
f  1974 
f  1974 






f  1974 
f  1974 
f  1974 
situation  with 
lower  contributions 
9% 
f 317 
f  193 
f  1269 
f  1269 




f  1022 
f  101 
f 2291 
f  1370 
f  1269 
In  this  example,  the  public  pension  contribution  of  the  (male)  respondent  in  the  basic 
situation  (BS)  was  493  Dutch  guilders,  whereas  it was  300  Dutch  guilders  for  an  average 
(middle-aged)  person.  The  public  pension  in  the  basic  situation  was  1974  Dutch  guilders. 
In  the  hypothetical  situation  with  lower  contributions  (LC),  the  contribution  rate  was 
determined  to  be  9%.  The  contribution  of  the  respondent  was  reduced  to  3 17  Dutch 518  E.C.M.  van  der  Hezjden  er al./J.  of  Economic  Behavior  &  Org.  32  (1997)  505-518 
guilders  and  that  of  an  average  person  to  193  Dutch  guilders.  The  pension  benefit  was 
reduced  to  1269  Dutch  guilders.  The  rates  of  return  decreased  because  of  the  lower 
pensions.  For  example,  the  rate  of  return  for  a representative  old  person  decreased  from 
3.5  to 2.9.  As  it was  assumed  that  differences  between  contributions  in  BS  and  LC  would 
be  saved,  the  respondent  would  save  176 Dutch  guilders  per  month  in  a savings  account. 
When  that  person  retired,  the  account  would  pay  him  1022  Dutch  guilders  per  month, 
whereas  an  average  male  middle-aged  person  would  get  101  Dutch  guilders  per  month 
(when  he  would  save  107  per  month  now).  The  large  difference  in  the  return  on  savings 
between  the  young  respondent  and  the  average  middle-aged  individual  exists  due  to  a 
difference  in  age  and  in  income.  For  the  respondent,  the  public  pension  plus  savings 
would  amount  to  2291  Dutch  guilders  (which  is higher  than  the  current  public  pension), 
while  it  would  be  only  1370  Dutch  guilders  for  an  average  middle-aged  person.  Finally, 
the  current  old  would  receive  only  1269  Dutch  guilders. 
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